BSE has not been found in the US * but current detection efforts provide little assurance that it does not exist at a low level. The US has taken precautionary measures to reduce the risk of importing the disease and the risk of the disease spreading if it were to be found. Those measures include a ban on feeding ruminant protein to ruminants-a measure the General Accounting Office concluded was not adequately enforced and which failed to halt the disease in the UK. We present an overview of BSE in the UK, the EU, and Japan and present an argument for additional precautionary measures in the US.
Introduction
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease, was first recognized in the UK in the mid 1980s. It is a degenerative disease of the central nervous system, resulting in the development of spongy lesions in the brain. BSE is classified as a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), variants of which include scrapie in sheep, and chronic wasting disease in deer and elk. The most common TSE affecting humans is sporadic (or classic) Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease (CJD), which affects about one individual per million worldwide, and whose cause is not known. All TSE diseases are fatal.
In 1996, UK government scientists announced that the "most likely explanation" for ten cases of a new type of CJD (labeled variant or new-variant CJD) was "exposure to BSE" (SEAC, 1996) . The announcement resulted in an immediate ban on UK exports of live cattle and all beef products, a 30 to 40 percent reduction in domestic beef consumption, and significant losses to beef producers, agribusinesses, and the treasury.
In this paper we summarize key events associated with BSE in the UK, Europe, Japan, and Canada. We then review the situation in the US where a native born case of the disease has not yet been discovered. We describe counter measures already in place, and argue, based on experience with the disease in other countries, that counter measures should be strengthened. Abbreviations used in the manuscript are listed in Table 1 .
The disease
Several questions remain unanswered about the cause, original source, incubation periods, and routes of infection of BSE. As to the cause, most but not all scientists believe the infective agent to be a modified prion 1 protein. From a biological perspective prions are simple structures without DNA, and thus more difficult to destroy than viruses or bacteria. Treatment of animal by-products at 133 ˚C at 3 bar pressure for a minimum of 20 minutes will destroy prions but for foods for human consumption there are no feasible processes to destroy the agent.
Some scientists believe the prion responsible for BSE resulted from mutation (Phillips et al., 2000) , while others suspect that BSE resulted from cross transmission of sheep scrapie (Horn et al., 2001 ). Scrapie has long been known as a disease in sheep and is found worldwide with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. The first recorded case in the UK dates from 1732 and there are an estimated five to ten thousand cases there every year. Scrapie could have spread from sheep to cattle as a result of changes in the rendering 2 system in the 1970's and the introduction of meat and bone meal (MBM) as a protein supplement in rations for young dairy calves (Horn et al., 2001) .
Once established, BSE spread within cattle and to humans and other species as tissue from infected animals entered the feed chain. Maternal transmission of BSE is considered possible, and scientists have not ruled out the possibility of lateral/environmental transfer between animals. However, the relatively small number of cases 3 in the UK in animals born after the feed ban was reinforced in August 1996
suggests that these routes of transmission do not operate at significant levels. Bosque et al. (2002) have demonstrated the presence of infectious prions in muscle tissue in mice.
Chronology

United Kingdom
The earliest recorded case of what was later referred to as "mad cow disease" was reported in 1984 on a farm in Sussex. Within a year, six more cows from the same farm had succumbed to the illness, but it was not until late 1986 that the condition was confirmed as a bovine TSE (see Table 2 for a chronology). In February 1990, UK began to contact non-EU countries about the risk from MBM imported from the UK (Phillips et al., 2002, Vol.3, Ch.6). 6 In 1989, the UK banned the use of specified bovine offal (SBO) for human consumption, thereby removing from the food chain potentially infective tissues from animals not showing symptoms of the disease. 7 Following discoveries that BSE could be transmitted to mice, domestic cats, and pigs, the ban on SBO was extended to all animal feed in September 1990. With both the ruminant feed ban and SBO ban in operation, officials felt confident that the disease would be contained.
In March 1991 came the first case of BSE in an animal born after the 1988 feed ban (referred to as a 'BAB'-born after ban). BABs were initially attributed to delays in clearing MBM stocks but with some evidence of deliberate breaches of the regulation.
However, in 1994 there were almost 10,000 BABs, suggesting serious problems with cross-contamination -either in mills producing feed for both ruminants and nonruminants, or on farms with mixed species. Furthermore, the number of BABs was indicative of the high level of infectivity in tissues derived from sub-clinically infected animals (since all clinical cases were being destroyed). In 1994, officials began finding cases in animals born after the 1990 SBO ban and to date there have been over 12,000 such cases. This suggests that in addition to problem of cross-contamination of feed, SBO tissues were not being properly removed in slaughter plants. animals are also infective. The ruminant feed ban sought to block step #3, but failed because of cross-contamination. Cross-contamination was (and remains) difficult to detect because of the lack of reliable tests for banned proteins in compound feeds. The SBO ban, which would block step #2, failed because of non-compliance. Part of the problem was that the animal SBO ban was poorly designed and essentially unenforceable with no means of identifying whether or not MBM contained SBO (Phillips et al., 2000) .
Human health risk
While the number of BSE cases mounted, the government continued to reassure the public that the disease posed no health risk to humans. Public concern had grown since BSE was first reported, especially when it was learned in 1990 that the disease could affect cats. Some scientists were also concerned -Professor Richard Lacey was quoted as saying that due to BSE, "in the years to come our hospitals will be filled with thousands of people going slowly and painfully mad before dying." Canada. In the absence of reliable tests for pre-clinical vCJD, estimates about the likely number of victims varies from less than 300 (Boelle et al., 2003) to 50,000 (Ferguson et al., 2002) to over a million (Huillard d'Aignaux et al., 2003) Following the March 1996 announcement, the UK government introduced new control measures including a ban on the use of all MBM of mammalian origin in all farm animal feed and the removal of animals over thirty months old from the human food chain. The over-thirty-months-scheme (OTMS) remains in operation and has accounted for almost six million animals.
Spreading it around
BSE spread from the UK through exports of live animals and contaminated feed.
Infected animals from the UK were detected in Canada, Oman, and the Falkland Islands, in addition to six European countries. The EU banned imports of live animals from the UK in 1989, as did Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and the US. However, among animals exported prior to 1989 it is unlikely that all BSE cases were detected.
Exports of MBM from the UK were relatively small during the 1980s, reaching approximately 15,000 tons (4 percent of production) in 1988. Most went to EU countries but some also went, either directly or via feed rations produced in the EU, to non-EU countries including Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka. In September 1991, the UK banned exports of MBM containing SBO to non-EU countries. But in view of subsequent revisions of how SBO was defined, it appears that until the mid 1990s, potentially infective MBM from the UK continued to be exported to countries that did not have ruminant feed bans.
BSE in Europe
In the early 1990s BSE spread to other countries in Europe including Ireland (ten From the mid to late 1990s additional cases were discovered in France, Portugal and Switzerland at relatively low rates, 9 with cases also appearing in Belgium and the Netherlands in 1997. Late in 2000, the first "homegrown" cases were discovered in Germany, Spain, and Denmark, followed by Italy's first case in early 2001. The market reaction was instant and dramatic. Beef consumption fell by about 30 percent, and exports by the EU to non-EU countries-notably Russia and Egypt-were halted.
German consumers, having been continually reassured by their government that their beef supply was free of BSE, reacted particularly strongly, with beef demand falling by about 50 percent as manufacturers of processed meat products scrambled to reformulate with pork instead of beef. The immediate price effects were so great (see Table 3 ) that at one point in the subsequent months the trade pattern for beef within the EU was almost completely reversed-with Germany exporting beef to Ireland.
In response to the crisis, the EU took a series of measures to safeguard public health and restore confidence in beef (see Byrne, 2002 ). These included:
1. BSE tests for all animals over 30 months intended for human consumption.
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Animals not tested were eligible for a Purchase-for-Destruction scheme.
2. All casualty animals over 24 months tested for BSE.
3. Use of MBM in all animal feed suspended and all MBM stocks destroyed.
4. Definition of SRM extended to include vertebral column and the entire intestine.
5. A ban on mechanically recovered meat.
The direct cost of BSE control measures for the EU was estimated to be over one billion euros for 2001.
Beyond Europe
The first case of BSE in Japan was announced on September 10, While there is no evidence to suggest that CWD can be transmitted to humans, the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization recommend that tissue from deer or elk with CWD not be used in animal or human food. 
Risk of BSE in the US
Adequacy of US Measures
In 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO, 2002) reported that measures adopted in the US did not sufficiently ensure that BSE would be prevented, citing weaknesses in import inspections, inadequate testing of animals that die on farm and noncompliance with the FDA feed ban.
The Feed Ban
The FDA feed ban represents an effort to exclude ruminant derived Meat & Bone Meal from ruminant feed (i.e. -an attempt to block pathway #3 in figure 2 ). This measure is less restrictive than feed bans adopted elsewhere -for comparison we adopt the following classification: 
Level 4. Prohibits mammalian protein for all animals (including pets)
The current US feed ban is less restrictive than that described at Level 1 because it permits certain ruminant proteins (milk, blood) in ruminant feed. The 1988 UK feed ban was at Level 1 -and while it no doubt contributed to the decline of the disease it was not completely effective due to cross contamination between ruminant and non-ruminant feed. In fact, over 44,000 cases of BSE have been confirmed in animals born after that ban was implemented (Figure 1 ). The 1994 E.U. ban prohibited all mammalian protein in ruminant feed -i.e., Level 2. In 1996, the UK reinforced its feed ban to Level 3 by banning MBM for all farm animals and fish. In 2001, the EU adopted a complete ban on MBM, and Japan has recently taken a similar measure.
The GAO cited weaknesses in FDA enforcement of the feed-ban, particularly in its efforts to re-inspect firms not in compliance with labeling requirements, and the adequacy of its inspection database. Given the extent of the cross-contamination problem in the UK and the enforcement problems cited by the GAO, it seems unlikely that the FDA ban provides adequate assurance that ruminant feed does not contain prohibited material.
Use of potentially infective tissues
The Harvard/Tuskegee report identified measures that would reduce the risk from BSE including a ban on rendering animals that die on farm, and the exclusion of designated "at risk" (e.g., died on-farm) and of those 760 tested positive for BSE. If the U.S had a similar incidence among "at risk" animals, 12,500 tests per year in that category would provide a 99.999 percent probability of detecting at least one positive case. But with no clinical cases to date, the incidence of sub-clinical BSE in the US herd, if any, must be at a much lower level. If, for example, it were present in US "at risk"
animals at the same level as in "healthy" animals in Europe (279 positives in 7.6 million tests, or approximately 1 per 25,000), testing 20,000 animals would provide about a 55 percent probability of detection -and it would require 120,000 tests to increase the likelihood of detection to 99 percent. In short, the fact that BSE has not yet been found provides little assurance that it is not present.
Some might argue that if BSE is present at an extremely low level the US would be better off not detecting it-especially if there is little chance of it spreading. However, the infectivity of sub-clinically infected animals (as demonstrated by the failure of the UK feed ban and SBO controls) is a characteristic of this disease that suggests the potential peril of ignoring its presence-even at an extremely low level.
Implications for the US.
A single case of BSE would have serious consequences for the US beef industry.
In a worst case scenario, beef exports, valued at around $3b per year -or twelve to fifteen percent of the value of production, would cease immediately and domestic demand would also fall. If the domestic response mirrored that in Germany and Japan, demand could decline by 30 percent, reducing revenues by over 40 percent in the shortto intermediate-run. 16 If recovery were to take five or six years, the cumulative loss would be on the order of $30 billion. On the other hand, if the impact on domestic demand was minimal, as was the case in Canada, and if importing countries were to abide by OIE and WTO guidelines pertaining to appropriate trade restrictions, the impact would be far less severe -perhaps on the order of $2b (i.e., about fifteen percent of value for half a year).
With the goal of maximizing expected net social benefit, the response to the threat from BSE is a matter of finding an appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of actions that mitigate the risk. But what type of risk, exactly, should US policy address?
We believe that additional countermeasures, if warranted, should target the economic risk to the beef industry -rather than the human health risk -posed by the disease. While some consumer groups are concerned about the risk to human health, the reality is that even if a few cases were discovered in the US the risk to consumers would still be incredibly low -on the order perhaps of that of being struck by a meteorite.
Are additional counter-measures warranted? If one takes the position that BSE is not present and extremely unlikely to occur, then any set of counter-measures, including those currently in force, could be viewed as unnecessary in the sense that they address a non-existent risk (Murphy, 2002) . However, the absence of BSE in the US is not so reassuring given the low level of surveillance. And while the US has probably taken as many precautions as any country in advance of BSE being discovered, we believe, in light of the EU's risk assessment and the discovery of the disease in other 'low-risk'
countries, 17 that a case can be made for modifying the USDA "official line" on BSE and for additional counter-measures.
In Germany and Japan, official assurances that those countries were free of BSE were unwarranted, contributed to loss of trust in government when the disease was discovered, and likely exacerbated the extent to which consumers moved away from beef.
But the USDA position on BSE risk is similar to that taken in Germany and Japan -the emphasis is on the fact that the disease has not been detected and the Harvard/Tuskegee report is cited to support the idea that the risk of BSE occurring is extremely low.
Because significant economic consequences would result from a single case, it might be better to acknowledge the possibility that some cases may be found, while at the same time enhancing counter measures that promote consumer confidence.
Given the low risk to human health, additional measures should focus on reducing the expected economic damage from BSE. In an effort to minimize potential export losses, the US is now encouraging adherence to the established OIE science-and riskbased guidelines on trade restrictions -despite the fact that the US itself has been one of the chief culprits in ignoring those guidelines. Regarding domestic demand, we believe it important, as did the GAO, to address human consumption of potentially infective CNS tissue. As already noted, for countries that cannot exclude the possibility of BSE, the WHO recommends a ban on SRM. 18 The Harvard/Tuskegee report also noted that banning SRM would reduce human exposure by 95%, and thus, in the event of BSE being discovered, would presumably reassure buyers, both domestic and foreign, that consumers of US beef were insulated from the disease.
Ideally, additional countermeasures would be implemented following rigorous cost-benefit analysis that indicated an increase in expected welfare. Such analysis is beyond the scope and intent of this article, but we can consider some aspects of what it would entail for a proposal to implement an EU type testing regime in the US. The direct cost of testing might be relatively easy to estimate. Of a total US slaughter of around 35 million cattle, about 5 million are cows. Data on age-at-slaughter is not available but, with most beef animals slaughtered between the ages of 20 and 24 months, the total 'over 30 month slaughter' including cows might be in the range of 7 to 9 million. Tests cost between $30 and $50 per head including lab fees etc, giving a direct cost of testing of between $210 and $450 million. In the absence of an individual animal ID system, there would be additional costs related to age verification. Benefits would depend on the context in which testing was implemented -for example, it might be a requirement to maintain access to specific export markets. In that case, the benefit could be calculated as the surplus from market access. However, there are other potential costs and benefits relating to the impact on demand. Demand might be enhanced as a result of increased consumer confidence, or diminished if the new testing regime finds unexpectedly large numbers of cases. The analysis is then far from simple, and outcomes would be sensitive to assumptions for which there may be little support. Further complications arise when one considers the alternative combinations of potential countermeasures and how they might interact.
In the absence of rigorous welfare analysis, we suggest that acknowledging the possibility of BSE and enhancing measures to further insulate consumers from the disease could help engineer, in political parlance, a "soft (or at least softer) landing" if the disease is discovered in the US. Importantly, taking those steps might reduce the likelihood of a sudden market panic and thus allow whatever additional measures are taken in response to a discovery to be more proportionate to the risk that is presented.
The goal should be to avoid the inefficiency of the Japanese situation in which very large costs are being incurred in response to what now appears to be an extremely low threat.
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Achieving that goal entails additional up-front costs, but the rate of return on "two stitches in time" is still favorable. 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 thousand tonnes EU non-EU 5 A test using the 3 rd eyelid is used to detect scrapie in live sheep. Progress has been reported on tests that use urine and blood samples but to date there are no approved live animal tests for BSE or CWD. All references to BSE tests in this paper refer to postmortem tests on bovine brain. 6 The list of countries contacted included Japan, Canada, and the US. 
